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CLAIMANT PROFILES
Ms. Majola
Ms. Majola is a proud South African woman from the

Mr. Rathod
Mr. Rathod is a proud South African of Indian descent. As

Xhosa ethnic group. As a consequence of the Group Areas Act,

a result of the Group Areas Act, Mr. Rathod and his family were

the apartheid government evicted Ms. Majola and her family

evicted from Marabastad, a vibrant, mixed-race community in

from Amstelhof and relocated them to a house in an African

Pretoria’s city center, and relocated to Laudium, a township the

township called Mbekweni that “was not complete, did not have

apartheid government reserved exclusively for Asians. When they

cement, no roof, nothing that showed that it was a home. It

were forced to leave their beloved home, the apartheid govern-

was very empty.” Ms. Majola scowled as she remembered “one

ment robbed Mr. Rathod’s family of a valuable asset and, more

thing that made me have hatred is because the way we leaved

detrimentally, it irreparably ripped apart valuable social ties. Mr.

there and our homes were demolished. Whether you like it

Rathod reminisced about the times before the eviction, “When we

or not you had to move. We were having no money and our

were little kids and we used to play together. We really used to

homes were not furnished.”

enjoy ourselves and we used to eat, like if your mother cooked we

Soon after the transition to democracy in 1994, Ms.

all sitting there and in one plate we having our food. We eating

Majola heard that the new government—led by the African Na-

out of one plate. It was a beautiful time I really, I thank the, I thank

tional Congress (ANC)—was compensating families like hers

God for letting me live in those years.”

who were evicted as a result of racially discriminatory policies.

Now, Mr. Rathod complained, life in Laudium is noth-

The Commission gave her R 25,000 (approximately $ 3,571)

ing like Marabastad “my neighbors they won’t even tell you good

as compensation for the apartheid state’s confiscation of her

morning.” Although nothing could compensate Mr. Rathod for the

deceased father’s house in Amstelhof. She spent the financial

lifelong relationships that he lost when the apartheid government

award to improve her father’s home in Mbekweni because she

evicted him and his family from Marabastad, he lodged a claim

thought this was the best way she could honor his memory.

for compensation with the Commission. The Commission paid R

She explained that during apartheid her father was an ANC

80,000 (approximately $ 11,428) in compensation for the racially

fighter and so he and the rest of her family made serious sac-

motivated confiscation of his father’s property in Marabastad. Mr.

rifices for South Africa’s liberation. “My father was a ANC. We

Rathod, however, received only R 10,000 (approximately $ 1,428)

couldn’t go to school because my father was very busy with

after the sum was split between his father’s eight children.

ANC. My father divorced my mother because of ANC. Did he

Mr. Rathod could have used the award to complete a

gain something from the ANC, nothing. Did we go to school,

minor home improvement, but his house was already renovated.

no because our father couldn’t support us. He is in Joburg,

He could have used the award to take classes, but he is retired

Durban, all over the world. The boss of his life was ANC.”

and no longer interested in improving his human capital. He could

Unfortunately, Ms. Majola’s father did not live to wit-

have invested the award in his family’s education, but his children

ness the end of apartheid, but the financial award from the

are educated, economically stable, and not in need of his monetary

Commission allowed her to improve his house so that it could

contributions. He could have invested the award in a high yield

stand as a memorial to him. Ms. Majola said that the money

financial instrument, but the return on R 10,000 was not worth

was able to heal “some of the wounds” but then she became

the trouble to Mr. Rathod, a successful businessman who owned

momentarily quiet and pensive then added abruptly “but not

a driving school and a trucking business at one time. Like many

really.”

other respondents from the upper-class, Mr. Rathod spent his
financial award on non-essentials.
“Man, to tell you the truth professor, I had to buy a TV
for my son and I don’t know what I did with the other money. I
really, I even forgot.” Then he looked slyly at his wife sitting next to
him and suddenly a mischievous smile broke across his face as he
confessed to me while still gazing at his wife, “but I think I went to
the casino to tell professor the truth.” His guilty admission caused
us all to burst into raucous laughter.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The constitution of South Africa mandates equitable redress for individuals and communities who colonial and apartheid era governments took land from after 1913 as a result of racially
discriminatory laws and practices. However, the constitution also allows current owners to maintain possession of their land regardless of the manner in which this land was obtained. In order to
accommodate both of these sometimes conflicting constitutional mandates, the Land Restitution
Commission (the Commission) has provided equitable redress for dispossessed populations either
by giving them financial compensation or purchasing land for them from current owners.

Did Financial Compensation Contribute to Economic Development?: The Commission’s TopDown Perspective
The function of equitable redress is not only to compensate past victims for financial losses,
but also to economically empower South Africa’s black majority. The Commission’s pervasive, institution-wide assumption is that recipients wasted the financial awards because the money is gone and
they are still in poverty. Consequently, in recent years, the Commission has shifted its policies away
from its former emphasis on financial compensation as a means of granting equitable redress and
toward a strong emphasis on land restitution.

Did Financial Compensation Contribute to Economic Development?: Beneficiaries’ Bottom-Up
Perspective
In contrast to the Commission’s assumption that financial compensation did not result in
economic empowerment and its consequent policy shift, the interviews I conducted with financial
award recipients show that in 30 percent of the cases the award did produce a substantial
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economic benefit. The majority of these people spent their financial award on improving their current home and thus increasing the value of their primary asset.
The evidence showed that financial compensation did not have an enduring economic impact
when recipients:
• received small awards or awards that constituted only small percentages of their overall
net worth;
• were more interested in making cultural rather than economic investments;
• were older and had a self interest in experiencing the benefits of the financial award while
they were still alive rather than spending their awards in ways that would produce a longterm economic impact that would primarily benefit others; or
• had several economically dependent family members.

Policy Recommendations
Since the empirical evidence shows that financial compensation did produce a long-term
economic benefit under certain circumstances, the Commission must reconsider its policy of deemphasizing the financial compensation option and instead adopt policies that improve this option
by:

Increasing the impact of smaller financial awards
• Allow claimants to choose between various forms of equitable redress, while providing
incentives for claimants to select options that will produce a long-term economic benefit.
• Provide financial counseling to claimants who elect to receive financial compensation.

Increasing the amount of financial awards
• Increase the amount of financial awards by treating beneficial occupants on par with dispossessed owners.
• Pay current owners just compensation rather than the more costly market value of their
property when purchasing land for dispossessed populations and use the savings to increase the amount of financial awards.
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUITABLE REDRESS
The constitution of South Africa affords equitable redress to
individuals and communities dispossessed of their land after
1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices.
Those dispossessed are entitled to compensation by way
of financial award or land restitution. This study analyzes
only the financial awards the Commission gave to people
evicted from urban areas.
In order to promote social reconstruc-

for past property violations. 2

tion, transitional states often must deal with

During South Africa’s colonial and apart-

past injustice. One particularly difficult issue

heid eras, the white minority usurped property

frequently facing these states is what to do

from millions of nonwhites without paying just

when former regimes have unjustly confiscated

compensation. 3 In the political transition from

property from one group and given it to an-

apartheid to democracy, the incoming political

other. The most common response is to do

administration—led by the African National

nothing. But South Africa, Kosovo, Romania, the

Congress (ANC)—entered into a bargain with

Baltic Republics, El Salvador, Colombia, Ger-

the outgoing apartheid government that dic-

many, Guatemala, Hungary, Slovakia, and the

tated what the new democratic state could do

Czech Republic are among the few nations that

to correct past land theft. The ANC conceded

have compensated their citizens for property

to the apartheid government’s demand to

violations that occurred under prior regimes. 1

constitutionally protect existing property rights

South Africa, however, stands head and shoul-

regardless of how the owners had acquired

ders above other nations because its citizens

their property. 4 This meant that even if, for

have a unique constitutional right to restitution

example, the apartheid government had
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after 1913, the year that the South African state
(formed in 1910) first used its legislative powers to dispossess Africans through the Native
Land Act. 6
The Restitution of Land Rights Act of
1994 (the Act) is the parliamentary act that
confiscated land from a black community and
transferred it at nominal cost to a white farmer,
if the farmer still owned the land at the end
of the apartheid regime, under section 25(1)
of the constitution, his rights to that land were

Land Claims Commission (the Commission)
with implementing South Africa’s restitution
program. 7 As of March 31, 2008, the Commission had rejected or authorized compensation
for (that is, “settled”) 95 percent of the 74,747

secure.
In exchange for this ample concession,
the ANC ensured that individuals and communities dispossessed of their land under white
minority rule were afforded certain constitutional remedies as well. Section 25(7) of the
South African Constitution states that a “person
or community dispossessed of property after
19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
restitution of that property or to equitable redress.” 5 Section 25 does not provide a remedy
for the vast majority of unjust land confiscations
that took place prior to 1913 under colonialism; instead, the liberation bargain only ensures
a remedy for property violations that occurred

4

gives Section 25(7) life. The Act charges the

claims lodged by dispossessed individuals and
communities—a laudable achievement by any
measure. 8 The Commission settled claims primarily by providing financial awards or restitution of land to people evicted from both urban
and rural areas. This study, however, focuses
exclusively on the 47,726 claims in which the
Commission gave financial awards to people
evicted from urban areas. 9

A person or community dispossessed
of property after 19 June 1913 as a
result of past racially discriminatory
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament,
either to restitution of that property or
to equitable redress.

PAYING FOR THE PAST: ADDRESSING PAST PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

While, under the provisions of the Act,

there with her husband. 12 She reminisced with

1913 is the key year for determining eligibility

affection: “the people of Marabastad, we were

for restitution, the majority of urban evictions

like a family. We knew each other.” Through-

happened under the Group Areas Act of 1950,

out the 1950s, the apartheid government de-

which was intended to accelerate the policy of

stroyed these valuable social bonds by evicting

separate development by removing Africans,

Marabastad’s residents and relocating them to

Asians, and Coloureds from urban areas de-

various townships far from the city center. Afri-

marcated for white occupancy. 10 According

cans were essentially dumped in Atteridgeville,

to the best estimates available, between 1960

Coloureds in Eersterust, and Asians in Laudium.

and 1983 the apartheid government removed

Mrs. Green’s home was expropriated without

approximately 3.5 million people from metro-

just compensation, and her family was forced

politan areas to either the cities’ peripheries or

to relocate to Eersterust. She is now a senior

to remote, rural homelands. 11 Vibrant commu-

citizen but still vividly remembers the bitter day

nities were dismantled, tight-knit families were

that she was essentially discarded:

separated, and valuable property was lost.

According to the best estimates available, between 1960 and 1983 the
apartheid government removed approximately 3.5 million people from
metropolitan areas to either the cities’
peripheries or to remote, rural homelands
One such community destroyed by the
Group Areas Act was Marabastad, a bustling,
mixed-raced neighborhood in Pretoria’s city
center. Mrs. Green is the alias I have given to a

My second baby Al was two weeks
old. Two weeks, and they just come.
They never gave us letters to say we
must move to this place. They just
come, said, “You must out, now, furniture and everything,” and just put it on
the truck and said, “You going to this
place.” … They lock my husband up.
I … I really do … don’t know for what.
Ja. My husband was locked up. They
couldn’t tell me why, and they come
after three weeks and told me, “Here’s
the lorry.” They just put the baby’s cot
first. I said, “But my baby, the milk,
and everything.” They said, “No, no,
no, no, no. Just come.” “Where are we
going?” “No, you’ll see … You’ll see
for yourself.” 13

Coloured woman and former resident of Mara-

Mrs. Green’s husband was never released and

bastad who owned a lovely eleven-room house

died in jail about eight years after this
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harrowing experience. The Commission paid

economically dominant, in part because they

Mrs. Green R 60,000 (approximately $ 8,571)

directly or indirectly benefited from past theft

to satisfy its constitutional obligation to provide

perpetrated by colonial and apartheid-era gov-

equitable redress for the property that the

ernments.

apartheid government stole from her family. 14
There was a crippling and enduring
economic effect when former governments
confiscated property from Mrs. Green and
others like her. Wealth is an intergenerational
phenomenon: it is accumulated during a per-

In South Africa, Africans and Coloureds
presently occupy the lowest rungs on
the economic ladder, due in part to the
fact that they have not recovered from
the catastrophic depletion of their assets during colonialism and apartheid

son’s lifetime and then passed along to kin. 15
Likewise, disadvantage is also accumulated over
generations such that the devastating tremors
from the initial theft of assets—like the theft of
Mrs. Green’s house—reverberate through
time. 16 In South Africa, Africans and Coloureds
presently occupy the lowest rungs on the
economic ladder, due in part to the fact that
they have not recovered from the catastrophic
depletion of their assets during colonialism
and apartheid. Whites, on the other hand, are

6

The Commission is a key player in South
Africa’s reconciliation process, and its job is not
just to determine and distribute equitable redress but also to ensure the awards contribute
toward the larger societal goal of social reconstruction. One important way that the Commission can work toward this goal is by ensuring that these financial awards have a long-term
economic impact so that past theft no longer
debilitates future generations.
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RESEARCH QUESTION
Did the financial awards that the Commission gave to people evicted from urban areas increase their net assets or
were the awards consumed with no appreciable effect on
the long-term economic well-being of award recipients?
According to the Act, the vision is “to be

In this study, the terms enduring and long-term

leaders in the restitution of land rights to vic-

economic impact are synonymous with an ap-

tims of racial land dispossession in a manner

preciable increase in net assets.

that ensures sustainable socio-economic devel-

Although the focus of this study is the

opment.” 17 As of March 31, 2008, the Com-

economic effect of compensation, I embrace

mission had spent R 4.9 billion (approximately $

the fact that this is not the only (or, necessar-

700 million) on financial awards. 18 It is impor-

ily, the most important) lens through which

tant to understand how individuals spent the

to view the restitution program’s outcomes.

money in order to assess whether the awards

In future works, I will evaluate the program’s

had an enduring economic impact and contrib-

outcomes from other perspectives. 19 Without

uted to sustainable socio-economic develop-

insinuating that there is one right way to spend

ment.

a financial award, 20 I will explore whether the
Using data from eighty semi-structured

interviews, this study will explore whether (a)

awards had a long-term economic benefit for
recipients.

the financial compensation the South African
government gave to Mrs. Green and other
people similarly evicted from urban areas has
increased their net assets; or (b) the compensation was consumed and has had no appreciable
effect on their long-term economic well-being.
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PRIOR STUDIES
The existing research suggests that individuals are more
likely to save rather than consume a large financial award,
as compared to a small award; however, the current literature has yet to examine the reason behind this pattern of
behavior.
Economists have developed a substan-

ginal propensity to consume out of permanent

tial literature examining consumption patterns

income.23 That is, people are more likely to

among the poor. There are, for instance, stud-

save windfall income (like financial awards) than

ies about how the poor in the United States

permanent income.

spend windfall (or unexpected) income such as
the Earned Income Tax Credit, which consists
of one large payment per year. 21 These studies find that most expenditure goes toward
durable goods, especially vehicle purchases
and transportation spending. 22 In addition to
the literature about the spending patterns of
indigent populations, economists have developed consumption theory, which predicts how
people, regardless of their income or class, will
spend windfall income such as the financial
awards distributed by the Commission. Milton
Freidman, the progenitor of this literature, suggests in his permanent income hypothesis that
the marginal propensity to consume windfall
income is considerably smaller than the mar-

8

People were more likely to save rather
than consume larger financial awards.
Kreinin, in his empirical study using data
from eighty-one Israelis affected by the Holocaust who, like the respondents in this study, received financial awards, found considerable support for Freidman’s hypothesis. 24 Landsberger
refined Kreinin’s study by investigating the effect
of the windfall payment’s size. 25 When he
separated 297 Israelis who received financial
compensation from the German government
into five groups, Landsberger found that the
marginal propensity to consume decreased as
the size of the windfall payment increased,
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validating Friedman’s hypothesis.26 That is,

tion patterns have been primarily quantitative.

people were more likely to save rather than

Thus, while the studies were able to determine

consume larger financial awards.27 If Lands-

the marginal propensity to consume windfall

berger’s work holds in the context of payments

income with a high level of statistical certainty,

made through the South African Land Restitu-

they could not offer deep insights into why peo-

tion Program, then my data should show that

ple fell into those particular spending patterns.

larger financial awards result in an increase in

To evaluate whether the Commission achieved

net assets while smaller awards are consumed,

the Act’s objective of promoting sustainable so-

with no long-term impact.

cioeconomic development, this qualitative study

Since the literature has been dominated
by economists, studies examining consump-

employs a socio-legal analysis that uses in-depth
interviews to analyze consumption patterns.

PAYING FOR THE PAST: ADDRESSING PAST PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

9

METHODOLOGY
The study is based on twenty-five in-depth interviews with
Commission officials and eighty in-depth interviews with
claimants who received financial awards from the Gauteng
and Western Cape Regional Land Claims Commissions.
Method for collecting the
data
From February to August of 2008, I conducted twenty-five semi-structured interviews
of Commission officials, which lasted between
thirty to ninety minutes each, were audio taped,
transcribed and were not completely confidential. I also completed 141 semi-structured
interviews of urban claimants that also lasted
between thirty to ninety minutes, were audio
taped and transcribed with the promise of
confidentiality (pseudonyms mask the respondents’ identities).28 Since the research question I address here is whether the financial
compensation distributed by the Commission
has increased recipients’ net assets, the sample
I use in this study is limited to eighty of the 141
interviews in which the respondents received
financial compensation as opposed to
restitution of land.

10

Before conducting any interviews, I obtained human subjects approval from my university. To select interview candidates, I relied
heavily upon the Commission’s financial data
lists, which are organized by community, contain
the names of all beneficiaries who received
financial compensation, and list the amounts
that they received. I first selected a community
based on certain variables of interest such as
race, award size, pre-eviction occupancy status,
award options, and effectiveness of community
leaders. I then randomly selected claimants in
that community from the financial data list. For
about three-quarters of the claimants randomly
selected, I was able to find a working phone
number from the Commission’s records department; and over 90 percent of the people I
was able to reach agreed to be interviewed.29
I conducted 80 percent of these interviews
entirely in English. In those instances when the
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respondent was not comfortable speaking in

tional respondents. Snowballing can introduce

English, I used a translator. I conducted the vast

a more severe bias because the resulting data

majority of the interviews in the respondents’

may reflect the views of a limited network of

homes so that I could verify certain facts such

acquaintances; thus it is best to use snowballing

as whether respondents used the compensation

for people who are difficult to identify. Conse-

to renovate their homes.

quently, I relied on snowballing to identify less

Although multiple family members were

than one-quarter of my sample, most of whom

entitled to compensation, I found that the Com-

were community leaders whom I was unlikely

mission generally communicated with (and

to randomly choose using the financial data list

had contact information for) only one family

but who had a wealth of information that was

member known as the claimant. Therefore,

extremely valuable to this study.

the downside of relying on the Commission’s

The methods I employed have certain

records was that active claimants—who were

limitations. First, I did not collect data on the

constantly interacting with the Commission—

ethnicity of Africans and so cannot discuss the

accounted for about 81 percent of all respon-

ways in which ethnicity informed how respon-

dents interviewed. Consequently, my data have

dents spent their financial awards. Second, the

a particular bias because these claimants were

data are not generalizable to the entire popula-

likely to have different opinions and experi-

tion because 47,726 urban claimants received

ences than those family members who played

financial awards, but I interviewed only eighty;

more passive roles. I tried to mitigate this bias

and while I did randomly select respondents in

by asking primary claimants to put me in touch

each community, I did not randomly select the

with other family members who had not played

communities. Consequently, my findings are

significant roles in the claims process, but I was

best suited to generating theory.

successful in fewer than five instances.
Although locating respondents primarily
using the Commission’s financial data lists and
records was not perfect, it was superior to the
alternative—the snowballing method—in which
referrals from initial respondents generate addi-
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Description of the sample
Table 1
Region
Gender

Race
Level of
involvement
Age
Relation to ODI
(Originally
Dispossessed
Individual)
Employment

Gauteng

Western Cape

36

44

Female

Male

Mixed Gender
Interview

39

39

2

African

Coloured

Indian

White

30

39

5

6

Active Claimant

Community
Leader

Passive Claimant

Unassigned

55

10

13

2

60 and under

61-75

76 and above

21

47

12

ODI

Child

Grandchild

11

55

14

Working

Unemployed

Unemployed
Pensioner

Unkown

25

5

49

1

Owner or tenant at Owner
time of eviction
35

Tenant
45

Since this study exclusively addresses

the Western Cape; in all regional offices, except

urban claimants, I limited the sample to claims

Gauteng, the Commission gave dispossessed

originating in South Africa’s two principal urban

tenants lower financial awards than the awards

centers—Gauteng and Western Cape (see

given to dispossessed owners on the principle

Table 1).30 45 percent of respondents were

that ownership rights were more valuable than

from Gauteng, while 55 percent were from the

tenancy rights. In Gauteng the early regional

Western Cape.

land claims commissioner, Blessing Mphela,

As seen in Table 2, one main difference

made an executive decision to pay both groups

between the two provinces is that Gauteng

equally; hence the average payout in Gauteng

systematically paid higher financial awards than

was consistently higher.31
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and most of those people were working.32 The

Table 2
Community
name

Median
Median
Individual Award for
Payout
Family
Claim

vast majority of respondents (74 percent) were
sixty or older and thus eligible for old-age pensions.33 Most urban evictions were executed

Western Cape
White

200,000

360,000

under the authority of the Group Areas Act of

District Six

18,000

38,00

1960; so many of the Originally Dispossessed

Paarl

25,580

25,580

Luylol

11,250

22,500

Mossel Bay

12,852

45,600

children (who were pensioners by the time of

Steurhof

14,280

35,400

Die Eiland

11,429

17,500

the study) were receiving compensation in their

Dysseldorp

4,893

29,500

Other

3,166

40,000

Individuals (ODIs) were deceased, and their

place. While 14 percent of respondents in this
study were ODIs,34 69 percent were their children, and 18 percent were their grandchildren.

Gauteng
Kliptown

50,000

102,020

The sample was balanced along gender lines

Evation

35,910

142,450

(50 percent women and 50 percent men) and,

Kilnerton

28,335

113,343

Sophiatown

28,000

70,000

Marabastad

46,666

60,000

This study separates claimants into three

in terms of race, included Africans (38 percent),
Coloureds (49 percent), Indians (6 percent),
and whites (8 percent).35 The majority of

employment categories—working (31 per-

African claims originated from Gauteng, while

cent), unemployed pensioners (61 percent), and

the Coloured claims were principally from the

unemployed (6 percent). The working category

Western Cape. The few whites in the sample

includes people who were working both part-

all hailed from the Western Cape and were

and full-time regardless of age. The unemployed

mostly working people under sixty.36 All the In-

pensioners category includes respondents aged

dians in the sample were from a community in

sixty or older whose primary sources of income

Gauteng called Marabastad; they were primarily

were their old-age pensions. The unemployed

male due to cultural norms of inheritance.37

segment covers respondents under sixty who

Determining each respondent’s class sta-

were not working. Only 26 percent of the

tus was a challenge since data on annual salaries

sample was under sixty at the time of the study,

were not available. However, since I conducted
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necessities of life such as food and shelter. I
classified them as working poor if they owned
a home and either someone in the household
was working or the necessities of life were
covered through some other source of income. I applied the term middle class if they
owned a home, the basic necessities of living
were covered, and the respondents enjoyed
some amenities such as nice furniture. I reserved the upper class tag for respondents
the vast majority of interviews in respondents’

who owned either homes that were far su-

homes, I was able to observe their surroundings

perior to others in the townships or modest

and possessions. I supplemented these observa-

homes in more expensive neighborhoods, and

tions with information that was revealed during

enjoyed amenities such as cars. In the sample, a

the interview to assign each respondent a class

statistically significant correlation existed be-

status. I classified a person as poor if it ap-

tween being poor and being a woman or an

peared they were struggling to pay for the basic

African.
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DID FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? THE COMMISSION’S
TOP-DOWN PERSPECTIVE
Interviews show that Commission officials believe that
financial compensation did not have an enduring economic
impact on recipients because after the awards were spent,
they were still in the same economic position.
The Commission’s process
for distributing financial
compensation
The dominant view among Commission
officials is that financial compensation has not
had a long-term economic benefit for claimants.
In order to understand the issue fully, however,
one must have a basic knowledge of how the
land restitution process has unfolded. In the
first of five phases, an individual or community
had to lodge a claim by December 31, 1998,
in order to become eligible for compensation;
these people were called claimants. In the
second phase, the Commission determined if
the claims were valid by researching whether
the claims met certain statutory requirements.

Each claim had to involve (1) a person, community, or a deceased estate or direct descendant
of a person or a community (2) dispossessed
of a right in land (3) after June 19, 1913 (4) as
a result of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices (5) without the receipt of just and
equitable compensation.38
Once the Commission determined that
a claim fulfilled these statutory requirements,
the Commission verified in the third phase
that the claimant was either the prior owner
or occupant of the property in question or the
descendant of the prior owner or occupant.
The Commission accepted various forms of
evidence to validate and verify claims, including
deeds, oral testimony, aerial maps, ruins,
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tombstones, and baptismal records.
During the fourth phase, called the ne-

and provide various forms of post-settlement
support. The Commission initially encouraged

gotiation phase, the Commission was supposed

claimants to choose financial compensation

to give claimants a choice between financial

because it was easier and quicker.

compensation, land restitution, or some other

During the fifth and final (valuation)

equitable remedy. The White Paper on Land

phase, the Commission determined the amount

Policy, the government’s definitive policy on

of financial compensation it paid claimants.

land matters, states that choice is to be central

The Commission paid most claimants using a

to the restitution process: “solutions must not

Standard Settlement Offer (SSO) that did not

be forced on people.”39 But, in truth, almost

reflect the current market value of the proper-

no one had the opportunity to craft his or her

ties in question or the properties’ market value

own equitable remedy because giving claim-

at the time of the evictions. The SSO ranged

ants choice and allowing them to craft their

from R 17,000 to R 60,000 (approximately $

own remedies would have involved taking time

2,428 to $ 8,571) depending upon the SSO

to consult with claimants and devise workable

amount adopted by each Regional Land Claims

arrays of options.40 The Commission had no

Commission, which changed over time. In most

such time; it had resolved very few claims from

regions there were different SSO amounts for

1995 to 1999 and so from 2000 to 2008 was

tenants and owners. The SSOs for tenancy

under extreme pressure to settle claims rapid-

rights started at R 17,000, an amount based on

ly.41

the cost of serviced sites in the areas the state
Due to time pressures, the Commis-

dispossessed the claimants from or the value of

sion not only failed to allow claimants to craft

the housing grants. This amount increased on

their own equitable remedies, but it also heav-

an annual basis as the housing subsidy increased.

ily encouraged claimants to accept financial

To determine the SSO for owners, each region-

compensation because this allowed it to settle

al office calculated the average municipal value

claims more rapidly. The alternative—land

for owners in a sample of areas in that region.

restitution—involves an expensive and lengthy

In both Gauteng and the Western Cape the

process requiring the government to identify

SSO started at R 40,000 (approximately

suitable land, purchase it, transfer it to claimants,

$ 5,714) and eventually increased to R 60,000.
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In 2003, the Minister of Land Affairs approved

counterproductive expenditures. An official in

the sliding scale, which allowed the Commission

the Western Cape RLCC was convinced that

to give increased compensation to dispossessed

“financial compensation is not having an effect.

owners whose land was in excess of six hun-

We will assist with payment in the morning, and

dred square meters.42

in the evening everyone is in the bottle store.
They don’t know what to do with the money.”44

The Commission’s perspective on financial
compensation
One Commission official estimated that
only “one out of ten make something
out of the compensation
By 2007 the Commission settled most
of its urban claims and completely switched its
focus away from providing financial compensation to fervently encouraging communities
and individuals to choose land restitution. For
varying reasons, most officials regret initially
giving claimants the option to receive financial compensation in the negotiation phase. In
interviews, some officials indicated it was a bad
idea because they believed people wasted the
money. One Commission official estimated
that only “one out of ten make something out
of the compensation.”43 Some officials insisted
that claimants spent the money on frivolous,

Another official shared a similar sentiment, he
felt that “cash is spent over a weekend, and
then they have no cash and no land.”45

“Financial compensation is not having
an effect. We will assist with payment
in the morning, and in the evening everyone is in the bottle store. They don’t
know what to do with the money.”
A different, more compassionate view
expressed by officials in the Commission was
that people spent the financial award on daily
survival rather than on alcohol or weekend
revelry. Tozi Gwanya, the Director General
of Land Affairs, succinctly articulated this view
when he stated that
the [Land Restitution] Act should not
have given the option of financial
compensation because the money is
consumed and there is no long-term
effect. We could have done without
financial compensation if there were
other options, creative options that
could have a transformative impact;
but proper thought was not put into
it. If we were given another opportu-

PAYING FOR THE PAST: ADDRESSING PAST PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

17

As a result, one Commission official
emphasized, “I am not encouraging them to opt
for financial compensation because, if removed
as tenant, they get paid R 40,000. If they were
an owner, then they get R 40,000 plus the sliding scale. It is under compensation only when
cash is involved; but with development they get
more because many lost barren land, and now
nity, things would be different, but it
is now too late in the afternoon. Now
we are just left with the rural claims,
and these will be land restoration.
We wrongfully assumed that people
are mature and can make their own
decisions, which is usually a good

they are assisted in getting a top structure.”47

assumption. But, once you factor in
poverty there is no rational thinking;
when you are poor what you eat next
informs you.46

market price for ownership, so we have the

Mr. Gwanya’s comments are informed by the
fact that land restitution is more economically
advantageous than financial compensation for
this reason: While many individuals and com-

The commissioner of the Western Cape RLCC,
Beverly Jansen, agreed that those who chose
financial compensation were undercompensated because “we cannot afford to pay current

SSO, which is not market related. If we could
do it again, then there would be no cash compensation or only in rare cases.”48

“If we could do it again, then there
would be no cash compensation or
only in rare cases.”

munities lost grazing or usufruct rights to barren land, through the restitution program, they

Part of the conundrum for Commission

received full ownership rights to land with im-

officials was why people chose financial com-

provements. In contrast, claimants who chose

pensation when it was not the most economi-

financial compensation only received paltry

cally beneficial choice. William Nero, Deputy

financial awards that were often far below the

Director of the Western Cape Regional Land

historic or current value of the property rights

Claims Commission, concluded that “a lot took

that were unjustly extinguished by the apart-

financial compensation, and I am disappointed.

heid and colonial-era governments.
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It makes me sad because it will not change their
life, and it is not sustainable. It does not make
sense. I ask myself why, and I think people are
settled where they are, or people are so poor
they see this as a temporary relief because poverty is endemic in the Cape Flats.”49
Some Commission officials believed that
financial compensation was detrimental not
only because people were undercompensated
but also because it undermined the larger
land reform project. At the end of apartheid,
87 percent of the arable land was owned by
whites, who constituted less than 10 percent of
50

the population.

Consequently, land reform

was imperative. In 1994 the new political dispensation, advised by the World Bank, aimed to
redistribute 30 percent of the country’s agricultural land in five years; but less than 1 percent
was redistributed by 1999, less than 3 percent
51

by 2003, and less than 5 percent by 2008.

Land redistribution, land restitution, and tenure
upgrading are the three central prongs of the
national land reform strategy, and land restitution accounted for 1.5 percent of the 5 percent
that had been redistributed as of 2008.52 But,
without the financial compensation option, the
Commission could have contributed far more
than 1.5 percent to the national goal.
Peter Piccolo, a Commission official,

insisted that “land reform’s purpose is to restore lost land rights or reallocate land to those
who were formerly disqualified. Land reform is
not the success all hoped it would be because
financial compensation is a valid and legal option. If this choice was not given, then we may
have seen other outcomes.”53 Angela Conway,
the executive director of a land-based NGO,
Southern Cape Land Committee (SCLC),
emphatically agreed saying “I think cash compensation is horrible. It will not transform levels
of poverty and land ownership. Claimants are
elderly, and it [the evictions] happened long
ago, and they are too old to move back. [The
financial compensation] gets you out of debt,
and it can buy a secondhand television or car,
but it does not address skewed land ownership
patterns.”54
While different reasons were given for
why financial compensation was a bad option,
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the resounding conclusion among Commis-

compensation cannot have a long-term effect

sion officials was that the financial awards did

on people’s lives, but where they have

not have an economically sustainable benefit

development [land restitution], the effect can

for claimants. The data I collected confirm that

be generational.”56

some claimants did spend their financial awards

But what Mr. Mphela, Mrs. Jansen, and

such that they experienced no increase in their

other Commission officials do not fully ac-

net assets, but significant evidence also indi-

knowledge is that the key factor is not whether

cates that people spent the money such that

the money is gone, but how it was used. For

they have experienced sustainable economic

example, when people use their financial com-

benefits. Commission officials assumed that

pensation to extend their homes or undergo

compensation had no long-term effect if ben-

significant home renovations, this increases the

eficiaries spent their financial award, but officials

value of a primary asset, which they can pass

failed to consider how that money was spent.

on to future generations. There is also a long-

For instance, Commissioner Mphela put

term economic benefit when a person uses the

it this way: “They spend it. Once the money is in

money to purchase an asset that can generate

hand, then poor people cannot postpone con-

capital such as a taxi, a high-yield investment

sumption. They spend it on tombstones, addi-

instrument, or tertiary education. These in-

tions to their house, and school fees.”55 Com-

vestments have the potential to benefit future

missioner Jansen also remarked, “I know many

generations just as the restitution of land does.

people are poor and the needs were so great

In the next section, I will move beyond

that the money was used up in the first three

the assumptions of Commission officials and

months. It was for food and clothing, adding on

use the interview data to explore whether

a room in the house, or buying a bed. Financial

financial compensation led to long-term economic benefits.
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DID FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? CLAIMANTS’ BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE
Contrary to the Commission’s perspective, interviews with
recipients of financial awards indicate that for 30 percent of
respondents the award had a long-term economic benefit.
Using qualitative data analysis software, I

they received from the Commission.

coded each interview transcript and marked re-

When respondents purchased depre-

spondents’ explanations of what they purchased

ciating assets, paid for improvements to their

with their financial awards. If a respondent used

homes that would not necessarily increase

the compensation such that it would increase

their value, paid off debt, or kept the money in

his or her net assets and have a long-term

low-interest-bearing accounts, this qualified as

economic effect, then I labeled this a substantial

a moderate economic impact. About 33 per-

economic impact. This includes instances when

cent of respondents experienced a moderate

people used their compensation to undertake

economic impact. The data are limited so for

major home renovations—such as purchas-

respondents in this category it is possible that

ing new roofs or ceilings, extending homes, or

the financial award resulted in a long-term eco-

plastering their houses—that were likely to in-

nomic benefit, but it is also possible that it did

crease the value of their homes. It also includes

not. For example, most people did not report

instances in which people used the money to

what type of debt they paid off, so it is possible

secure tertiary education or purchase income-

that this debt was acquired to make value-

generating assets like taxis. About 30 percent

increasing home improvements or to purchase

of respondents experienced a substantial eco-

depreciating assets, such as cell phones, which

nomic impact as a result of the financial awards

allowed these claimants to search for or secure
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employment more effectively. It is also possible

Studies that explore consumption theory

that respondents used the restitution money

have found that larger financial awards are likely

to pay off debt and as a consequence later had

to increase recipients’ net assets while smaller

money available to complete value-increasing

awards are likely to be consumed with no long-

home improvements. The data’s limitations

term economic benefit. 57 This study’s findings

make it difficult to determine whether the

are consistent with this observation. Table 4

financial awards given to respondents in the

shows that the average amount received by

moderate economic impact category led to

respondents in the substantial economic impact

increases in net assets.

category was significantly higher than the aver-

When respondents spent their money

age for the moderate economic impact cate-

on things that would not have a lasting eco-

gory, which was in turn higher than the average

nomic impact, I labeled this a low economic

for the low economic impact category.58

impact. This category includes, for example,

Also, the data show a statistically signifi-

expenditures on food and other necessities

cant positive correlation between the size of

of daily living, luxury goods, travel, and cultural

the award and an increase in net assets. The

investments such as tombstones. Although one

more interesting story that prior studies ex-

dominant view among Commission officials was

ploring consumption theory do not develop

that financial compensation had absolutely no

is how and why larger financial awards lead to

sustained economic effect for the overwhelming

an increase in recipients’ net assets. To explore

majority of claimants, surprisingly only about 30

this, I will contrast respondents whose finan-

percent of the respondents fell into this catego-

cial awards had a substantial economic impact

ry.

with those whose awards had a low economic
impact because the differences are most clear
at the extremes.

Table 4
Frequency

Percent

Median restitution
award

Mean restitution
award

Substantial Impact 24

30%

28,335

127,274

Moderate Impact

26

33%

20,000

48,761

Low Impact

30

38%

15,000

23,399

Total

80

100

22,669*

66,478
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1. Financial compensation had a substantial economic impact
When financial awards had a substantial economic impact,
it was primarily because the awards were large enough to
allow recipients to complete home remodeling projects.
Smaller financial awards increased net assets when respondents: (1) had the financial wherewithal to combine the
awards with their own money, (2) completed only minor
renovations, or (3) completed substantial renovations in a
piecemeal fashion over longer spans of time.
The general trend
A financial award could have a substantial economic impact in several ways including: increasing the value of an existing asset (for example, by completing a home improvement project);
increasing an individual’s human capital and thus her capacity to earn money in the future (through
job training courses, tertiary education, or the like); allowing for investment in a long-term, high-yield
savings instrument (such as a three-year certificate of deposit); or funding investment in a small business (such as a street-side vending enterprise). Despite the array of available options, almost all of
the respondents whose financial compensation had a substantial economic impact spent the money
on renovating their homes, thereby increasing the value of their primary assets.59
A representative story was that of Mrs. Moore, who received about R 25,000 (approximately
$ 3,571) from the Commission. She proudly reported that “we improved the house; made ourselves more comfortable. We built a carport, so on, you know. We did the bathroom, the toilet,
made it more attractive so that when we sold that house we got a very good price to what we
bought that house for.”60 Respondents made a wide range of improvements to their homes, but
most commonly they purchased new roofs, extended their homes, installed new ceilings, added
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security features, or plastered the walls.
The amount of compensation people
received affected the scale of their renovations
and hence the monetary value they added
to their homes. People who received smaller
sums were only able to make modest renovations that in turn only modestly increased the
value of their homes. The experience of Mrs.
Majola—a pensioner who was evicted from
Paarl, a mixed-raced community in the Western Cape—was representative. She said, “[T]
hat R 25,000 I spent it trying to extend my
father’s house. But that house is not complete.
It’s because the money is too small. I do say I
was happy to get R 25,000 because my father’s
house is rebuilt because we had now three
rooms there. And they were not done, these
houses. It was only three rooms, but if you can
go there now, you’ll find it’s a little bigger. It’s
still going up to a great house, but I haven’t got
any more wings to fly.”61
In contrast, respondents who received
larger sums, and thus had the resources “to fly”,
were able to remodel their homes and substantially increase the homes’ value. Mr. Jones com-

Steurhof. “I renovated my front here, made a
little sunroom you know. And then I built on a
workroom for my wife. She does cake decorating and things like that. So it’s a little workroom
for her, and then I enclosed the back stoop.”62
A brother and sister who each received R
28,000 (approximately $ 3,500) for the home
their family was evicted from in Kilnerton
combined their financial awards to significantly
remodel the home they both live in as well as
their grandmother’s home.
Brother: Just it [the renovation] had
enlightened everything. The house
looked gloomy. It looked like an old
house. So after renovation it looks
bright.
Sister: And of course up till today everyone says “Oh! This house is good”
not knowing just this is [laughing] a
facelift. 63

pleted significant renovations with the R 48,000

Mrs. Mpho, a pensioner who lives in Soweto,

(approximately $ 6,857) award he received

received R 142,450 (approximately $ 20,350)

from the Commission for a large property that

for a large piece of land her father owned in a

his father had owned in a community called

community called Evaton. With this relatively
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large sum she was able to make substantial

Mrs. Reed, like Mr. Kagiso and many other

renovations that brought immediate profit. “I

respondents in the substantial economic impact

used the money to improve the house, pay rent,

category, was determined to use the money

and buy food. I’m alright now. I fixed the house

in a way that honored her family: “I thought of

outside and built three rooms outside that I am

my grandparents, and my father was also hard

renting. I am in the house and eat well. I buy

working. And he, each time three o’clock he

bread and food until my death approaches. It

must get up, me and my other sister then go to

was hard before I got the compensation, but

the market selling greens. He was hardwork-

now as long as I have milk and pap, I am okay.”64

ing, and my grandfather also. So I say I can’t go

The evidence is consistent; people in the

roam with this money. I can’t go buy material

substantial economic impact category spent

things for the house or something like a couch.

their financial awards primarily on home im-

I needed something like a business.”66 Mrs.

provements. But, the more interesting question

Reed used her financial award to make home

is why they made this choice. For many people,

improvements and purchase a taxi because she

the economic benefit of renovating their homes

wanted to memorialize her father and grand-

was not what motivated them to do it. Instead,

father who lost so much but did not live long

the home improvements served as a memo-

enough to experience the sweet taste of justice.

rial to their parents and other family members
who were devastated by the evictions but did
not live long enough to receive compensation
from the post-apartheid government. Mr. Kagiso, a young, passionate man, was only two years
old when his family was brutally evicted from
Simonstown, a seaside community of Africans in
the Western Cape. He said, “I did nothing for
myself. Nothing at all for myself. I didn’t even
buy a car for myself. You see, I was just try-

“I thought of my grandparents, and my
father was also hard working. And he,
each time three o’clock he must get up,
me and my other sister then go to the
market selling greens. He was hardworking, and my grandfather also. So
I say I can’t go roam with this money.
I can’t go buy material things for the
house or something like a couch. I
needed something like a business.”

ing, according to my pride, I was just trying to
change the shape of my mother’s house.”65
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Exceptions to the general
trend

Mrs. Mzi was also able to significantly
increase her net assets with the R 11,000
(approximately $ 1,571) she received; but, un-

Although the general pattern is that
larger awards lead to an increase in net assets,

like Mr. Farley and Mr. Wilson, she is a pensioner
of limited means.

there are a few cases in my sample in which
small financial awards led to increases in net
assets. More specifically, only 16 percent of the
people who received awards amounting to less
than R 20,000 (approximately $ 2,857) experienced a substantial economic impact, but we
can learn from these anomalous cases. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Farley, for example, received small

Mrs. Mzi: I used the money for extending … It was still a small house.
I made some two rooms in the back,
and I finished the inside. We did the
walls, we painted down here, added
the tiles. I changed the light.
Interviewer: And was it [the financial
award] enough to do all that? Was it
enough to put in those two rooms and
the ceiling, tiles, and the walls?
Mrs. Mzi: No, not at all, but it gave me
a start …

financial awards of R 2,000 (approximately
$ 285) and R 3,000 (approximately $ 428), re-

For those of limited means, undertaking a reno-

spectively. They both used the money to

vation was a piecemeal affair that stretched out

upgrade their homes and increase their net as-

over several years. The renovations started at

sets.

67

One is a school principal and the other

is a successful businessman, so they both had

times of high liquidity and stopped when the
money ran dry.

the financial resources to supplement their

Others, like Mrs. Mzi, who were people

financial awards to complete their home im-

of humble means, were able to use their mea-

provements. Mr. Farley said, “I used my money

ger financial awards to modestly increase their

to fix something at my home. I didn’t want to

net assets by completing very limited reno-

spend it on a party and so on, and when I’m

vations, but over short periods of time. Mr.

looking at my roof I can say to myself that is

Moseneke, for example, used his R 10,000
68

part of the money I received from that time.”

(approximately $ 1,428) to tile his ceiling and

Despite his determination to spend his money

plaster his walls, while Mr. Kagiso used his R

to memorialize his family’s loss, without addi-

11,000 to make a minor extension to his house.

tional financing, Mr. Farley would not have been

Mr. Kagiso said, “I just put some garage and

able to upgrade his roof.
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extended a little bit, not too much, from here
to that window. Yes, that’s all, and the money get
finished. It was a little money.”
In sum, when financial awards had a

2. Financial compensation had a low economic impact

substantial economic impact, it was primarily because the awards were large enough to
allow each recipient to complete some type
of home remodeling project. But there were
also cases in which smaller financial awards
increased net assets because those respondents
had the financial wherewithal to combine the
awards with their own money to complete major renovations, because they completed only
minor renovations, or because they completed
substantial renovations in a piecemeal fashion
over longer spans of time. Respondents’ most
common motivation for renovating their homes
was to honor those family members who were
most affected by the dispossession but died before the post-apartheid government provided
compensation. Small financial awards given to
claimants who were cash-strapped or did not
own homes had little chance of having a substantial economic impact because respondents

Respondents in the low
economic impact category,
on average, received smaller financial awards then respondents in the substantial
economic impact category
and tended to spend their
awards on the needs of everyday living; on non-essentials; or on cultural investments such as tombstones.
Despite the size of the financial award, it was likely to
have a low economic impact
when the pressure to immediately consume the award
was too great.

did not use the awards to, for instance, enroll
in job-training classes that would improve their

Generally, the findings in this study are

human capital or invest in high-yield, long-term

consistent with the conclusions of prior stud-

savings instruments.

ies: those in the low economic impact category
received smaller financial awards that were
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consumed with no long-term economic benefit.69 The average amount received by respondents in this category was R 24,068 (approximately $ 3,438), about one-fifth of the average
amount received by those whose financial
awards led to a substantial economic impact

that amount.” But don’t give nine
people R 36,000, and the other one is
just one particular, he gets the same
as you, R 36,000. I mean, look, it
doesn’t make sense. At least with R
36,000 you can do something with it.
You can buy yourself a nice car. But
with R 4,000 what can you do?72

Mrs. Doe, who received R 5,000 (approximately

(see Table 4).70

$ 714), agreed with Mr. Yusef and perfectly

Generally, the findings in this study are
consistent with the conclusions of prior
studies: those in the low economic impact category received smaller financial awards that were consumed with
no long-term economic benefit.

articulated the frustration of others who also
received small awards. When she was asked if
the money had changed her life in any way, she
responded with great ire, “It was too little to
change my mind. This little bit of money, oh my
goodness. R 5,000—eish! It’s so little.”73

The awards received by respondents in
the low economic impact category were systematically less primarily because the Originally

The general trend
Three distinct patterns emerged in the

Dispossessed Individuals (ODIs) were dead

way respondents in the low economic impact

and the Commission’s policy was to split these

category spent their financial awards. They con-

financial awards among all descendants of each

sistently spent it on the needs of everyday living,

deceased ODI according to the laws of intes-

on non-essentials, or on cultural investments

71

tate succession.

Mr. Yusef expressed a com-

such as tombstones.

mon frustration with the Commission’s decision
to provide only symbolic (rather than marketrelated) compensation and then to divide these
small awards among descendants:
If they had given us, like, say, “Okay,
this is prime [land] then we will give
you R 400,000.” Then you can divide
it. “Okay, like, if you are just a single

“I just spent it [the financial award]
in the house whenever I run short, you
know. I’m a pensioner, and, you know,
sometimes, sometimes I run short, you
go fetch a little bit of that money and
use it in the house.”

person, then we will come down with
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The first trend the interview data reveal
is that people in the low economic impact category spent the award on daily survival, which
most commonly included expenditures on food
and other basic household items. Mr. Colbert’s
experience was representative. He received
R 16,000 (approximately $ 2,285) and said, “I
just spent it [the financial award] in the house
whenever I run short, you know. I’m a pensioner, and, you know, sometimes, sometimes I run
short, you go fetch a little bit of that money and
use it in the house.”74 Like many others, with
her small award of R 2,000 (approximately
$ 285), Mrs. Jameson bought “just the household stuff, food [laughs] and something I want
to, stuff that I couldn’t afford to use. I couldn’t
afford to use my pension on that, so that something extra helped me to buy something.” The
Ntombena sisters, who were so close that they
frequently finished each other’s sentences during the interview, each received about R 22,000
(approximately $ 3,142) and spent it on food
and other household items as well. “We bought
curtaining [said in unison]. I bought curtaining
[laughs], and a few bedding things, that’s all. And
food. Most of it went on food because food
is so expensive nowadays. You go into a shop
now and spend more than R 4,000 for groceries.” 75 This first trend shows that people used

their financial awards to create an economic
buffer that ensured they were living comfortably above their survival point rather than
below it.
The second trend the study reveals is
that people in the low economic impact category often spent their financial awards on
non-essentials. Mr. Smidt’s story was representative. His deceased grandfather was evicted
under the Group Areas Act, and Mr. Smidt and
his three brothers had to share his deceased
father’s portion of the award. He stressed that
his share was so small that there was no chance
that it could have an enduring financial benefit.
“But when I got the R 800 and to me it was a
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waste of time. I had it in my pocket, and within

size of an award is the primary variable that

a second it was gone. I thought I would give it

determines whether it is consumed or used to

to my mum, but when I got the money it was

increase a recipient’s asset base.80 The data in

all gone [laughing]. Actually, that little I got, I

this study suggest, however, that the percent-

couldn’t do something with it.”76 Mrs. Valley is

age of the respondent’s income that the award

a thirty-something legal secretary who received

represents is also an important factor worthy

about R 3,200 (approximately $ 457), which

of further exploration. There were significantly

was her deceased mother’s share of a finan-

more upper-class people in the low economic

cial award.77 Mrs. Valley spent her R 3,200 on

impact category than there were in the sub-

CDs and a new refrigerator. “So I enjoyed that

stantial impact category.81 The experience of

[financial award]. I spent it on nonsense actu-

Mr. and Mrs. Lerato provides insight into this

ally [laughing]. It [the fridge] was just very old,

observation.

and it was, like, making noises at night [laugh-

The Leratos were a sweet old African

ing].” 78 Mr. Rathod, a retired entrepreneur, took

couple who, after over sixty years of marriage,

his wife on a trip to the casino with his R 7,500

endearingly referred to each other as “my old

(approximately $ 1,071).79 Respondents who

lady” and “my man.”82 They were retired teach-

received small awards consistently spent them

ers who had built an impressively furnished

on non-essentials primarily because there was

home with custom ceilings in a Pretoria town-

very little else respondents could imagine do-

ship called Mamelodi. Since their home was

ing with such small sums. Investments in home

already upgraded and they were living comfort-

improvements, long-term financial instruments,

ably, they used the R 57,000 (approximately $

or small business required more money than

8,142) they received on “this and that.” 83 They

they had, while investments in job training and

explained to me that the money did not change

other self improvement ventures required more

anything for them, but it might have made a

imagination than same had.

difference for people who were struggling.84

Even when the Commission distributed

Similarly, Mr. Kane was a retired insurance sales-

slightly larger financial awards to people in

man with a comfortable lifestyle. He received

the upper class, they often still spent them on

R 25,580 (approximately $ 3,654) and empha-

non-essentials. Prior studies suggest that the

sized that he “used the money to enjoy life.”85
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there is little else they could imagine doing with

“I saved it and then I went on a trip to
Australia, but I didn’t take all the [restitution] money. I took from my own
money also … We are going to Australia again and New Zealand, and there’s
no restitution money.”

the money. Upper-class people who received
larger awards also spent them on non-essentials
because the awards were small in relation to
their overall wealth and thus viewed as extra
money to play with.
The third trend my analysis shows is

Other financially well-positioned respon-

that making an economic investment was not

dents combined their own money with the

a priority for respondents in the low economic

financial awards to take trips. Mr. Budlender

impact category. Instead, they were more

went to Australia with his financial award of R

concerned with making cultural investments

26,800 (approximately $ 3,828). “I had money

through the purchase of tombstones. Interest-

already; I mean it’s saving and working hard and

ingly, people in all categories—substantial, mod-

knowing how to turn around your money. I

erate, and low economic impact—purchased

saved it and then I went on a trip to Australia,

tombstones. But, while respondents in the sub-

but I didn’t take all the [restitution] money. I

stantial economic impact category usually used

took from my own money also … We are go-

their financial awards to make home improve-

ing to Australia again and New Zealand, and

ments and purchase tombstones, respondents

86

there’s no restitution money.”

Mr. Jain, a suc-

in the low economic impact category often had

cessful entrepreneur, used his financial award of

only enough financing to buy the tombstones,

R 30,000 (approximately $ 4,285) to take one

foregoing home improvements and the like.87

of his several trips to Mecca. Likewise, Mrs.

Mrs. and Mr. Sibanda, the brother-sister

Smith—a well-off Coloured woman whose

duo, explained the importance of a tombstone.

family emigrated to Australia during the apart-

Mr. Sibanda said that its purpose was “to be

heid years—received an award of R 85,000

remembered by all.”88 The sister chimed in and

(approximately $ 12,142) and used the money

added that “it’s for us to get our great-great-

to finance a vacation back to South Africa. In

great-great-grandchildren to know where their

sum, people who received small financial awards

great-great-great-grandfather or grandmother

often spent them on non-essentials because

is. That’s the meaning for a tombstone for us.”89
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Mr. Lesedi offered another view of the impor-

mother’s or in your sister’s grave, it is something

tance of tombstones: “You know, you never

very big. It is like you paying your respects; you

really live comfortably in your life after your

are saying, ‘I am building a house for you as I am

parents have died and there’s no remembrance.

staying in the house.’ ”91 Mrs. Nthabi echoed

A tombstone is a … it’s a symbolic gesture to

a similar sentiment when she said that “I even

say we thank you for having brought us into this

told my sister that if they gave me this money

world, number one. And secondly we cannot

I’m gonna make a tombstone for my parents

afford to forget you, and thirdly that each time

… I won’t enjoy it and I don’t want to enjoy it

obviously when there’s no tombstone the grave

because it’s for my parents, I must do it for my

perpetually becomes … it’s neglected.”90

parents so that they can sleep well.”
In sum, the dominant patterns are that

“I think all of us here in South Africa,
putting a tombstone on your mother’s
or in your sister’s grave, it is something
very big. It is like you paying your respects; you are saying, ‘I am building a
house for you as I am staying in the
house.’ ”

respondents in the low economic impact category spent their financial awards on the needs
of everyday living; on non-essentials; or on
tombstones. In addition to these three patterns, the data also reveal a fourth trend, an
interesting correlation between a respondent’s
age and how she or he spent the money. Since

Many of the owners and occupants who
were evicted during apartheid died before they
were able to see the day when the new democratically elected government would provide
compensation for the atrocious injustices executed by the previous governments.
Mrs. Ngcobo insisted that erecting tombstones
was a way to replace the houses the deceased
lost by building them homes in their final resting places. She said that, “I think all of us here
in South Africa, putting a tombstone on your
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older people have larger portions of their lives
behind them than ahead of them, one might
hypothesize that this group would not be so
concerned with the long-term economic benefit of their financial awards. The data support
this hypothesis, and the experience of the Maru
family is illustrative.
Mr. Maru submitted a claim on behalf of
his aged, ailing mother, who used the money
for her immediate medical needs. He said,
“My mother was still alive at that time. So we,
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we decided whatever the money, when the R

so her priority was to build tombstones for her

40,000 came, it went straight to her. She did,

husband and in-laws. “I just said, ‘This is my hus-

eish, she, it did help her because she had a

band’s parent’s money.’ And I took that money

medical problem. She had a stroke, and then it

and, I’m telling my true story, I took that money

helped to pay for her medical. She was here [at

and made tombstones for them. Yes, because

home] for two and a half years, bedridden, so

it was their money.”94 Mrs. Madala is a pen-

we had to get the specialized beds and things.”92

sioner with a beautiful home in the township

Like many other older claimants, Mrs. Maru’s

of Mamelodi, which had already been extended

priority was not to make a long-term economic

and upgraded. She lived comfortably, and her

investment; because she was approaching the

children are grown and successful, and also

end of her life, satisfying her immediate needs

have their own houses. Usually a person in her

was paramount.93

situation is likely to spend the award on nonessentials, but since she deeply believed that the

Exceptions to the general
trend
As revealed in prior studies, those in the

money rightfully belonged to her in-laws and
husband, she spent the money to benefit them.
The last case involved the Goodes, a

low economic impact category received smaller

Coloured family from Kliptown, a small town

financial awards that were consumed with no

near Soweto, Johannesburg. The apartheid

long-term impact. There were four cases in the

government stole fourteen properties from

study, however, in which respondents received

Wayne Goode; and as part of the land restitu-

larger awards but nevertheless experienced a

tion process, the Commission made an attempt

low economic impact. In three of these cases,

to “wipe their tears” by giving the family R

the respondents received sizable awards but

840,000 (approximately $ 120,000) in com-

decided to make hefty cultural investments

pensation. Mr. Goode’s daughter talked about

through the purchase of several tombstones.

how a humble Coloured chauffeur was able to

Mrs. Madala received a large award of about R

acquire fourteen properties during apartheid:

113,000 (approximately $ 16,142) as compensation for the eviction of her husband’s parents,

When he used to come home weekends then he’ll start building, improving himself. I suppose he wanted to
leave work; he was a chauffeur where
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he worked, and Saturdays and Sundays he used to be busy building,
and then when one room is finished
he would hire it out. He had nobody
else to help; he was also earning a
small wage. That is how he built from
room to room and then have enough
and buy another place and then go on
building. He was a very hard worker.
He never drank or smoked; he was
just a hard worker.95

The apartheid government ruthlessly

Mrs. Douglass, who each received a financial
award of R 65,000 (approximately $ 9,285)
and his daughter, Mrs. Gains, who received R
210,000 (approximately $ 30,000).
In accordance with evidence in prior
studies, the relatively large financial award increased Mrs. Reed’s net assets; she used the
money to upgrade her home and purchase a
taxi. In contrast, the sizable financial award did

took away everything Mr. Goode had worked

not significantly improve the net assets of Mrs.

tirelessly to acquire and paid him a farthing.

Douglass or Mrs. Gains. All three women were

Inexplicably, one year after Kliptown was de-

from the same family, were not educated be-

clared a white area and Mr. Goode and all other

yond standard five, and were either divorced

Coloureds were callously removed, the apart-

or widowed and so did not have husbands to

heid government reclassified it a Coloured area;

rely on. Given their similarities, why the differ-

but, in a particularly cruel move, the apartheid

ent outcomes? Their stories bring to light an

government did not return the expropriated

important observation: the financial needs of

houses to their original owners. After this

those economically dependent on the respon-

heartbreaking experience, Mr. Goode and his

dent played a large role in how the compensa-

wife moved to Lesotho because he could not

tion was used.

countenance being evicted once again. He

Mrs. Douglass and Mrs. Gains used the

died in Lesotho a bitter man. The government

bulk of their money on their financially de-

moved the rest of his family to Protea, another

pendent adult children. Mrs. Douglass’ only

township just outside of Johannesburg, and after

daughter had been ill for some time (and was

they had once again established themselves, the

deceased at the time of the interview); Mrs.

apartheid government again evicted them and

Douglass used part of her money to pay for

forced them to move to El Dorado Park, where

her grandson’s private secondary school tuition

they lived at the time of the study. I interviewed

and to pay for the upkeep of the home where

Mr. Goode’s granddaughters, Mrs. Reed and

they were residing. She said, “Isn’t it, I was feel-
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ing sorry because at the time she wasn’t feeling
well. I had to help her with the child to keep
in school. If I didn’t pop out money, the child
wouldn’t make it to school. I don’t know if what
is gonna happen to the child.” 96 Likewise, Mrs.

children don’t give you back what they
take from you. So now I’m really living
on my pension. What can I do if they
don’t give? And besides they’re not
working.97

In contrast, Mrs. Reed’s three daughters

Gains explained that she used her money to

were economically self-sufficient individuals

support her unemployed children and grand-

who were waitressing in America and London

children:

to make money. Mrs. Reed combined her

Here I’m sitting with nothing. Maybe
it is my fault. Maybe I was too lenient
with the children, feeling sorry for
them because your children you borrow them, you never get it back. A
person you must not concentrate on
the children because your children can
sometimes be your enemies. I’ve got
grandchildren, big children, the one
says, “Mommy, borrow me this,” so
you give there and you end up with
nothing. I can’t say the one son
borrows, “Mommy, I’ll give you,” and
the other son also borrows, and the

financial award with her daughters’ earnings
and purchased their first taxi. After continually
reinvesting their profits, they built a thriving enterprise of five taxis. The lesson is that, despite
the size of the financial award, if the recipient
is unemployed and the sole breadwinner for a
large group of destitute and dependent people,
then the award is not likely to increase her net
assets because the pressure to immediately
consume the award is too great.
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POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the impracticality of limiting equitable redress to land
restitution, the Commission must take steps to ensure that
financial awards produce enduring economic benefits. The
Commission can accomplish this by increasing both the impact of smaller financial awards and the size of the awards
generally.
In its early years, the Commission fo-

The Commissioner for the Eastern Cape

cused on distributing financial awards. The

described how the financial compensation op-

Commission has changed gears and is now

tion has been de-emphasized: “The Act gives

de-emphasizing the financial compensation

the option of cash, so people don’t want devel-

option and emphasizing land restitution partly

opment; but, if you minimize the financial and

because its dominant institutional belief is that,

accentuate development, the community goes

overall, financial compensation had absolutely

along.”98 A project officer from the Western

no long-term economic benefit for recipients.

Cape shared his personal experience with the

This study suggests that this assumption is false;

Commission’s post-2007 policy of de-emphasiz-

in fact there was a sustainable economic impact

ing the financial compensation option:

in about one-third of the cases in the sample.
Nevertheless, based on its questionable conclusion, the Commission has now indirectly
taken the financial compensation option away
from the remaining claimants (who are mostly
claiming rural lands) and is persuading them to
choose land restitution.
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Now we don’t encourage it [financial
compensation]. But before in the
options workshop we presented all
options comprehensively; but we realized people want quick cash, so we
now present development comprehensively. When we talk about financial compensation, we run quickly
through it because the same people
who have been settled come back to
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seek land via other programs. This is

es to land transfer when bureaucratic incapacity

why we are pushing development.99

has drastically reduced the value of this option.

Another method the Commission has

The available evidence suggests that the Com-

used to discourage claimants from choosing

mission’s attempts to transfer land to claimants

financial compensation is making the financial

have failed on several counts.

awards small. A deputy director at the Com-

First, transferring land to individuals and

mission said, “We need to give low amounts so

communities takes the Commission an ex-

people choose land. In Wallmansthal [a rural

tremely long time. Tragically, while beneficiaries

land claim located near Johannesburg], financial

wait for the Commission to produce results, the

compensation is R 20,000, so many are not

people most affected by the evictions (ODIs)

choosing it. I think we should be able to force

are dying; people are losing faith in the process

claimants to choose land.”100 The director gen-

and becoming disillusioned; and land prices are

eral confirmed that, by official policy, “financial

steadily rising, which decreases the amount of

compensation is less in value than land, and this

land the Commission can purchase given its

is done to discourage people from taking finan-

limited budget.102

cial compensation. This is in line with practice in

Second, even when the Commission has
transferred land to communities, ensuring that

Germany and Estonia.”101

But it does not make sense to limit
claimants’ choices to land transfer when
bureaucratic incapacity has drastically
reduced the value of this option.

the community is able to use the land effectively has posed a serious challenge. There are
numerous reports of communities receiving
agricultural land and not having the resources
to develop it or to continue existing farming

Because it is working on the assump-

operations; additionally, in some instances weak

tion that financial compensation had absolutely

governance structures have caused community

no enduring economic effect for recipients, the

disputes to proliferate.103 Consequently, there

Commission’s strategy with the remaining claims

are several cases in which the land that com-

is to transfer land to communities and de-em-

munities have received from the Commission is

phasize the financial compensation option. But

lying fallow or is underused.104

it does not make sense to limit claimants’ choic-

This shortcoming is not completely the
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Commission’s fault because its original political
mandate extended only to determining and distributing equitable redress, but it has found that
once it transfers land to claimants, they require
significant post-settlement support.105 The
Commission does not have the organizational
competence to provide these services; however,
the Department of Agriculture does.106 De-

make choices that result in
an enduring economic benefit. The Commission should
also provide financial counselors who ensure claimants are aware of all of their
choices.

spite its supposed expertise, many of the farms
the Department of Agriculture has transferred

Forcing people to choose land restitution

to beneficiaries are also failing.107 Since the

is not the correct policy direction, but giving

state has proven it has limited capacity to trans-

people meaningful choices is. In a prior article,

fer land, then it must find ways to make financial

I argued that when dispossession is part of a

compensation more effective, instead of remov-

larger strategy of dehumanization, it involves

ing it as an option altogether. To do this, I argue

more than just the confiscation of an individual

that the Commission should increase the eco-

or community’s property; it involves an attempt

nomic impact of smaller awards and increase

to confiscate people’s humanity and remove

the amount of financial awards.

them from the social contract.108 This leads to
what I call property-induced invisibility. 109 I argue

1. Increase the economic impact of smaller financial awards

that in the face of property-induced invisibility,
the state’s task is not just to compensate the
dispossessed for past property violations, but to
do it in a way that reintegrates them into the
social contract and makes them visible. That

The Commission should
create various types of financial awards and provide
incentives for claimants to
38

is, the state’s responsibility is to restore dispossessed individuals and communities to their
rightful place in the polity.
“Reparations is the return of property
that does not emphasize rebuilding a relation-
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ship to society, while restoration is the return of

sion to maintain the financial compensation

property that emphasizes rebuilding a relation-

option and also distribute vouchers in lieu of

ship to society through asset-based choices.”110

cash to ensure that financial awards systemati-

Restoration is about giving the dispossessed a

cally have a long-term economic impact. For

choice as to how they are compensated and

example, if the Commission wants to promote

allowing them to decide the terms of their

home improvements, a person entitled to a

inclusion into the social contract.111 The Com-

R 20,000 financial award should also have the

mission could allow the individuals or commu-

option of instead receiving a R 30,000 voucher

nities that were wrongfully evicted to choose

to purchase building materials from a home

from these options: the return of their land; the

improvement store that has partnered with

receipt of alternative land (if their original land is

the Commission. Likewise, if the Commission

no longer available); financial compensation; or a

wants to encourage beneficiaries to use their

series of in-kind benefits. In-kind benefits could

financial awards to improve their human capital,

include, for instance, free higher education for

then it could offer a 25 percent increase in the

five family members, subsidized access to credit,

financial awards when they are used to make

or priority in an already established housing

payments directly to qualifying educational insti-

program.

tutions. The key is to give beneficiaries choice
and to incentivize (not force) them to use their

Reparations is the return of property
that does not emphasize rebuilding a
relationship to society, while restoration
is the return of property that emphasizes rebuilding a relationship to society
through asset-based choices.
Although choice is essential to a meaningful and
successful land reform process, the Commission

financial awards such that they have a lasting
economic impact.112

Although choice is essential to a meaningful and successful land reform
process, the Commission is intent on
reducing the available choices by eliminating the financial compensation option.

is intent on reducing the available choices by
eliminating the financial compensation option.
The superior policy choice is for the Commis-

To increase the likelihood that financial
awards (especially smaller ones) have an endur-
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Commission may not be up to the challenge.
Second, the choices must have wide appeal
because a choice between highly undesirable
options is no choice at all. The process of
determining the available options has the poing economic impact, the Commission should
provide a financial counseling session for each
financial award recipient. Financial advisors
would give a comprehensive description of
the various kinds of financial awards and assist
claimants in planning how to spend the award.
Tozi Gwanya, the director general of land affairs,
agrees with this approach.
We should have provided financial advice on how to spend the compensation like they do when you win the lottery. This did not happen because of
the weakness of officials. This should
happen in the options workshop. We
did force beneficiaries to open bank
accounts to get the money, but Absa
[a major South African bank] did not
do what they were asked; the banker
was supposed to provide financial advice. The weakness is that the bank
sells their products and not broader
financial instruments.113

While the choice-centered approach I
propose is strong, it is far from perfect. There
are three primary challenges: First, it demands
a highly efficient, noncorrupt bureaucracy that is
able to determine the available choices.114 The
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tential to occur in a top-down manner; but the
options will not have wide appeal if claimants
are not involved in crafting them. Consequently,
it is extremely important that the Commission
ensures that claimants are meaningfully involved
from the beginning in crafting the available options.
Third, and most important, providing a
creative range of choices for claimants will not
change the skewed land ownership patterns
that have stymied South Africa’s democracy
since its inception. The fact that whites, who
constitute less than 10 percent of the population, now own over 82 percent of the arable
land is a radical injustice, and the policy recommendations suggested in this study do nothing
to address this.115 This means that the other
two prongs of the land reform process (land
redistribution and tenure reform) must bear
the full weight of correcting this severe imbalance.116 But, this is okay because land restitution is unique. It is the part of the land reform
strategy that should be predicated on choice
because some individuals and communities
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whose land was stolen decades ago are no longer interested in land restitution because they
now have other priorities.117

2. Increase the
amount of financial
awards
The Commission should
increase the amount of financial awards by ensuring
it does not overpay current
landowners so that it can
use the savings to purchase
more land for dispossessed
populations. The Commission should also increase
the sum given to beneficial
occupants to match what it
gives dispossessed owners.
Do not overpay current
landowners
This study confirms the observation

impact.118 Consequently, it is important to
explore ways in which the Commission can
increase the amount of financial awards. One
way the Commission can do this is by paying
current landowners just compensation rather
than Fair Market Value (FMV).
According to the constitutional bargain
made in 1994, whites—who, as a consequence
of apartheid and colonial-era land theft, then
owned 87 percent of the fertile agricultural
land despite being only 10 percent of the population—would get to keep the property in their
possession, regardless of how it was acquired.
In exchange, blacks received the promise of

that larger financial awards are more likely than

land reform. If the ANC had not conceded to

smaller awards to have an enduring economic

this seemingly unfair liberation bargain, then
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white minority rule might not have ended
without a blood-drenched civil war and without
destroying the economy that the ANC would
inherit. But the bargain came at a high cost: it
further reinforced existing structural inequalities
among the races.
Whites immediately received the benefits of the bargain because the democratic
regime legitimated and constitutionally protected their property rights as soon as it came

As part of the constitutional bargain,
the liberation parties nimbly negotiated to have the state take FMV into
account in addition to several other
equity-enhancing factors when paying
just compensation. Nevertheless, my
interviews with Commission officials
revealed that when the Commission
acquires land, it often pays the FMV
without regard to the other equity-enhancing factors.

into existence. Thus, if the government used
its powers of eminent domain to take the land

Although whites must receive just com-

for redistribution, it would have to pay just

pensation when the state expropriates their

compensation, which is a market-related calcu-

property, the constitutional bargain ensured

lation.119 In contrast, Africans have a constitu-

that the calculation of just compensation is not

tional right to equitable redress, which in urban

based on FMV alone. According to section

areas unfortunately has translated into a sym-

25(3) of the South African constitution,

bolic financial award that has no relation to the
past or current market value of the properties
in question. In short, whites get market-related
compensation, and Africans get symbolic compensation. As a result of this compensationbased, structural inequality, from its inception in
1995 to March 31, 2008, the Commission spent
R 7.8 billion to acquire land (paid mostly to
white farmers to acquire their land) and only
R 4.9 billion to distribute financial compensation
(paid primarily to dispossessed African commu-

the amount of the compensation and
the time and manner of payment must
be just and equitable, reflecting an
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected, having regard to all relevant
circumstances, including the current
use of the property; the history of the
acquisition and use of the property;
the market value of the property; the
extent of direct state investment and
subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and the purpose of the
expropriation.121

nities and individuals).120
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As part of the constitutional bargain, the libera-

the equity-enhancing factors negotiated by the

tion parties nimbly negotiated to have the state

liberation parties have been ignored. The Com-

take FMV into account in addition to several

mission must reduce the substantial amount

other equity-enhancing factors when paying just

it is paying to white farmers by abiding by the

compensation.122 Nevertheless, my interviews

constitution’s equity-enhancing factors found in

with Commission officials revealed that when

Section 25(3) so that it can increase the mea-

the Commission acquires land, it often pays

ger financial awards it distributes.

the FMV without regard to the other equity-

The primary downside of taking into ac-

enhancing factors. There are several reasons

count the equity-enhancing factors is that doing

behind this phenomenon.

so requires extensive research into the history

Negotiated land reform (that is, involving

of each plot of land and one researcher’s find-

willing sellers and willing buyers) is the principal

ings can vary widely from another’s. This un-

method of land acquisition.123 But it gives cur-

certainty leaves current owners unsure of their

rent landowners a serious advantage in nego-

land’s worth and can hamper investment and

tiations because the supply of farms for sale is

trade.126 In addition, one primary reason that

small, the demand is high for particular proper-

the Commission and the Land Claims Court

ties due to ancestral connections or proximity

have largely ignored the equity-enhancing fac-

to established communities, and the transaction

tors is that they are extremely difficult to incor-

costs involved in rejecting landowners’ of-

porate into a calculation that determines a plot

fers and starting the process again are high as

of land’s value.127 If, for example, a researcher

well.124 The landowners’ advantage is solidified

successfully outlines a property’s history, it is

by the poor negotiation skills of Commission

still not clear how this should impact its value;

officials (who are not trained in negotiation)

or if the apartheid state subsidized a property’s

and ineffective service providers who do not

initial acquisition, it is not clear whether this

properly research the equity-enhancing factors

should impact the current owner. Despite the

of properties as part of the valuation pro-

challenges, the equity enhancing factors are a

cess.125 As a result, the Commission has paid at

key part of the liberation bargain that the Com-

or above the market price for properties, and

mission cannot ignore. If the Commission and
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the Land Claims Court establish clear rules

political objective of restitution—to eliminate

for enforcing the equity-enhancing factors and

the divisions of the past—was the most impor-

implement them consistently, then these chal-

tant and overriding consideration. He believed

lenges will diminish. This, however, has yet to

that treating dispossessed owners better than

happen.

tenants reinforced the inequalities of the past.

Increase the financial
awards beneficial occupants
receive

Another way that the Commission can
increase the minimum award size is to
stop paying dispossessed owners more
than dispossessed tenants.

Another way that the Commission can
increase the minimum award size is to stop
paying dispossessed owners more than dispossessed tenants. In most provinces, dispossessed
tenants received approximately R 25,000, while
dispossessed owners received R 60,000 or
more.

128

The only province that has never

distinguished between dispossessed owners and
tenants and has treated both equally is Gauteng, and as a result, the average financial award
in Gauteng is higher than in other provinces
like the Western Cape (see Table 2). Gauteng
stands alone because it did not comply with the
legal advice that dispossessed owners were entitled to more compensation than dispossessed
tenants because they had ostensibly lost more.
Gauteng’s progressive policy was instituted
by its early regional land claims commissioner,
Blessing Mphela, who strongly believed that the

During apartheid, an ownership disparity
existed among nonwhites as part of apartheid’s
racial hierarchy: Africans were at the bottom,
whites were at the top, and Coloureds and
Asians occupied the liminal space between the
two.129 The prohibition against African land
ownership solidified their position at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. 130 Coloureds and
Indians had relatively more opportunities to
own land, although they were also heavily encumbered by restrictions on ownership.131
The Act, however, attempts to equalize
these past ownership disparities, as its inclusive
definition of right in land places everyone on
equal footing. “‘[R]ight in land’ means any right
in land whether registered or unregistered, and
may include the interest of a labour tenant and
sharecropper, a customary law interest, the
interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrange-
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ment and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to

increase the average award.
The downside of acknowledging benefi-

the dispossession in question.”132 Under the

cial occupants is that it can already be a

Act, tenants who occupied their home for ten

serious challenge to determine whether a claim

years or more prior to dispossession are ben-

of dispossession meets the statutory require-

eficial occupants, and in the interest of justice,

ments and is valid. It may be asking too much

the Act places them on equal footing with

to require the Commission, in addition to this,

claimants who possess more formal registered

to determine whether the claimant lived on the

rights.

property continuously for ten years or more
But the Commission ignores the concept

prior to being evicted and thereby qualifies as

of beneficial occupation when it distributes

a beneficial occupant. Despite the difficulties,

financial compensation and treats everyone

the Commission must change its insistence on

without a deed as a tenant. In Paarl—which

giving former owners a higher financial award;

prior to the Group Areas Act was a mixed-race

ignoring the category of beneficial occupation is

community in the Western Cape’s scenic wine

a policy that reinforces apartheid’s legacy in-

country—initially owners were paid R 40,000

stead of dismantling it.

while tenants were paid a mere R 25,000.133

In sum, Mr. Nkwinti—who since the

Since Africans could not own land in Paarl

study’s completion has become the Minister

because of the discriminatory practices of the

for Rural Development and Land Reform—

apartheid government, for reasons of equity it is

—declared that “depending on the type of

important that the Commission pay beneficial

political choices we make, and the decisions

occupants the same amount as owners. Failing

we take now, the type of administrative actions

to do so simply reinforces the injustices com-

we take, the processes, procedures and institu-

mitted by the apartheid government; but sadly

tions we put in place, will either bring about the

the Commission has not treated beneficial

desired social cohesion and development or

occupants on equal footing with owners with

will perpetuate the colonial-apartheid’s social

registered rights. If the Commission changes its

fragmentation and under-development.” 134 The

policy and pays beneficial occupants the same

correct administrative action is for the Commis-

amount as owners, then it will also successfully

sion to reverse its policy of effectively remov-

PAYING FOR THE PAST: ADDRESSING PAST PROPERTY VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

45

ing the financial compensation option. Instead,

who elect to receive financial compensation.135

the Commission should increase the economic

The Commission should also increase the size

impact of smaller financial awards by (1) allow-

of financial awards by (1) taking the equity-

ing claimants to choose between various forms

enhancing factors into account and using the

of equitable redress, while providing incentives

consequent savings to increase the financial

for claimants to choose the methods that will

awards for dispossessed populations, and (2)

produce a long-term economic benefit, and

taking seriously the category of beneficial occu-

(2) providing financial counseling to claimants

pation.
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CONCLUSION
The Commission has assumed that financial compensation
did not contribute to economic development because the
money has been spent and ostensibly people’s financial positions have not changed. Based on this assumption, the
Commission has, in practice, removed the financial compensation option. But, this study finds that financial awards
produced enduring economic benefits for 30 percent of
respondents so the Commission should rethink its policy
choices in light of this new empirical evidence.
South Africa’s Land Restitution Program

tion’s goal of economic transformation. Using

is one of the boldest attempts made by a tran-

data from eighty semi-structured interviews of

sitional nation to address past property viola-

claimants who received financial compensation,

tions. By settling the majority of urban claims,

this study’s findings contradict the Commission’s

the Commission has completed a herculean

conclusion because financial compensation had

task and accomplished what many thought was

a substantial economic impact for 30 percent of

impossible. If, in its early days, the Commission

respondents.

had not focused on distributing financial awards

Prior empirical studies that have ex-

instead of land restitution, then it would have

plored the effects of financial awards and other

accomplished much less because of the dif-

windfall payments have concluded that larger

ficulties involved in land restitution. Based on

payments result in an increase of net assets

anecdotal information, however, Commission

while smaller awards are consumed with no

officials have concluded that financial compen-

long-term impact.136 The results of this study

sation did not have any long-term economic

are generally consistent with this conclusion, but

benefits and has failed to contribute to the na-

there are several important additional observations:
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First, respondents who received larger

people were interested in making cultural rath-

financial awards were generally able to increase

er than economic investments. People who re-

their net assets through investments in their

ceived larger financial awards were usually able

homes. People who received smaller awards

to purchase tombstones and renovate their

had to combine the awards with their own

homes, whereas those who received smaller

finances to complete substantial home improve-

awards had enough financing only to purchase

ments; or complete less ambitious renova-

tombstones, but not to invest in their homes.

tions in a piecemeal fashion when funds were

Fourth, given their limited remaining life

available; or undergo limited renovations that

span, older people had less interest in spend-

in turn only modestly increased the value of

ing their financial awards in ways that would

their homes. The majority of respondents who

produce a long-term economic impact. Lastly,

renovated their homes were not motivated by

the financial capacity of the respondents’ chil-

the economic benefits, but rather they were

dren played a large role in how respondents

trying to honor their family members who died

used their compensation. If the recipient was

before the post-apartheid state compensated

the sole breadwinner for a large group of un-

them. It was not likely that poor claimants who

employed and economically dependent fam-

received small financial awards or who did not

ily members, then the financial award was not

own homes would experience an enduring

likely to increase her net assets because the

economic benefit because the Commission did

pressure to immediately consume the money in

not create opportunities for people to use the

support of family members was too great.

awards to improve their human capital by, for
instance, taking classes.
Second, the majority of respondents

To ensure that financial awards have an
increased economic impact, this study suggests
two policies. First, the Commission should stop

whose financial awards did not produce a long-

de-emphasizing the financial compensation

term economic benefit either received small

option. Instead, the Commission should make

awards or awards that constituted only small

financial counselors available who will assist

percentages of their overall net worth. In these

claimants in choosing between various types of

cases, respondents often spent the money on

financial awards including in-kind options. The

daily survival or non-essentials. Third, many

second policy suggestion addresses the fact
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that the Commission is paying current land-

The racially motivated evictions carried

owners fair market value for their properties

out under colonial and apartheid-era regimes

when the constitutional bargain mandates only

severely violated the human rights of millions of

just compensation, which can be a significantly

South African citizens. Families were economi-

lower amount. The Commission should stop

cally hobbled, and invaluable social bonds were

overpaying current landowners and instead use

destroyed. The tears of these families have

the savings to increase the minimum financial

wet the pages of history and made them heavy

award. Third, the Commission should increase

with despair; and to its credit, the South African

the average financial award by paying beneficial

government has used financial compensation

occupants the same amount it pays those dis-

as one mechanism to try to wipe away these

possessed owners who possessed more formal

tears. While its efforts to date have been noble,

registered rights.

there is much work to be done.
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